The paper examines the informational content of market data when these data are incorporated into traditional models that predict bank failures. To assess whether financial markets can provide timely information about firm distress, we first examine the pre-failure behavior of market variables over long periods before failure. The univariate results document distinct patterns of declining prices, negative returns, declining dividends, and rising return volatility several years before failure. 
Introduction
Failure prediction represents a special interest in banking because of the regulated nature of the industry as well as the federal safety net provided by deposit insurance. In this regard, bank supervisors depend on "traditional" models to forecast bank failure; these models are based on financial data obtained from quarterly Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports) . 1 In recent years, at the behest of the U.S. Congress, international regulatory bodies, and the academic community, bank regulators have been exploring whether data obtained from the securities markets (debt and equity) can be used to supplement failure-prediction models. To the extent that financial markets are efficient and market price and return movements for securities can be used to anticipate events including failure, then bank regulators might apply information embedded in market prices and trading patterns to improve early-warning and off-site monitoring systems. Improved early-warning systems necessarily enhance bank supervision, thereby reducing the likelihood and cost of failures. More generally, integrating market-based information into the tools of bank supervision represents a partial response to Flannery's (1998) call for enhancing our understanding of the use of market information in prudential bank supervision.
Predicting failure is especially interesting because failure normally follows the dissemination of large amounts of negative information, often over long periods of time. Failure is also the only financial event for which the post-event stock price is known before the event. The period before failure is almost always associated with negative returns, the cessation of trading on organized exchanges, and the fall of prices to approximately zero. These regularities suggest that the period preceding failure should provide an environment conducive to the formation of trends in market-based data.
This paper develops two themes on the relation between equity market data and bank failure. 2 The first theme examines long-term trends in market variables before failure to see if financial markets can provide timely information about firm failure. Early research by Pettway (1976, 1980) and Pettway and Sinkey (1980) , and later research by Davies (1993) , identified return patterns several years before bank failure. Our approach extends that previous work by exploring the longer-term pre-failure trends of a wide variety of equity market variables for actively traded institutions. This perspective provides a global view of the pre-failure price and return patterns-a view that finds several trends before bank failure.
The second theme builds on the first by testing the extent to which equity market variables improve the predictive performance of traditional "ratio"-based models of bank failure. 3 Given the breadth of our focus, the analysis uses market variable benchmarks that are not generally representative of variables commonly used in previous research. In so doing, we test the extent to which market variables can be viewed as distinct, or as providing a different perspective, from other types of financial variables identified by previous theoretical and empirical work.
The results show that univariate analysis documents distinct patterns of declining prices, negative returns, declining dividends, and rising return volatility several years before bank failure. However, no clear trend emerges for several other market measures, including trading volume and share turnover. Multivariate analysis shows that market information such as equity prices and returns improves the failure-predictive content of the traditional models, which are 2 The advantages of using equity market information over using data obtained from the debt markets have been articulated by Saunders (2001) . 3 Among the many papers using only financial accounting data are Sinkey (1975) , Bovenzi, Marino, and McFadden (1983) , Elmer and Borowski (1988) , Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998) , and Kolari et al. (2000) . Shumway (2001) uses a limited number of market variables in a traditional ratio-based model, but otherwise focuses on the forecasting advantages of hazard models. Commercial models, such as the "KMV" model described by Crouhy, based only on Call Report financial ratios. In-sample and out-of-sample predictions show that the use of stock market data does improve the forecast of bank failure.
The next section discusses related literature. The subsequent section presents the sample and data and is followed by a section studying long-term univariate trends of returns, risk, and other market-related variables for the period before failure for sample institutions. Then comes a section in which logistic regressions are performed to test the predictive content of market-related variables versus the content of financial data to explain bank failure. The last section concludes.
Related Literature
It is well known that equity prices of banks destined for failure appear to fall for long periods before failure, thereby generating abnormal negative returns over those periods.
However, few studies have analyzed these pre-failure return patterns of failed institutions. As mentioned, Pettway (1980) and Pettway and Sinkey (1980) find patterns of negative excess returns in banks as much as three years before failure, as well as similar patterns almost a year before regulators begin the examination that initially identifies the problems preceding failure.
One limitation of this work was a limited sample of only six large-bank failures. Davies (1993) found that market information can help predict bank and bank holding company insolvency (not failure) when used with accounting and supervisory data. However, the analysis suffers from the use of only a single market variable-the market-to-book capital ratio.
While not focusing on bank failures, Curry, Fissel, and Elmer (2003) found in recent work significant declines in stock prices, abnormal returns, and volatility of returns preceding regulator-assigned CAMELS ratings to the problem-bank level (3, 4, or 5) two years before the Galai, and Mark (2000) , are also known to use market variables, but their specifications are proprietary.
rating changes. Berger and Davies (1998) use event-study methodology and find that the equity market anticipates upgrades in regulatory ratings but follows downgrades. Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) find that regulators acquire information sooner than bond rating agencies and the equity markets, but the regulatory assessments are less accurate in predicting the future performance of bank holding companies than either stock or bond market indicators. However, Simons and Cross (1991) found no evidence that the market was cognizant of regulator downgrades before the event for a sample of 22 large bank holding companies.
Several recent studies have incorporated market data into traditional default or bankruptcy models to determine if the information adds value in identifying troubled institutions. Krainer and Lopez (2001 , 2003a , 2003b find that equity market variables, such as stock returns and equity-based expected default frequencies, can be useful to bank regulators for assessing the financial condition of bank holding companies. Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) found that a measure of financial viability based on equity market data (expected default frequency)
helps predict the financial condition of bank holding companies as reflected in their regulatory ratings. Finally, Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2003) find that market-indicator variables such as excess returns and volatility of returns add value to models in predicting changes in bank holding company supervisory risk ratings.
This paper augments the existing literature on several fronts. First, as mentioned, we focus on the long-term pre-failure trends for a wide variety of market variables that have generally not been used in previous work. This long-term analysis will shed light on the signaling and timing aspects of market data. Second, we use equity market variables along with quarterly financial data to predict bank failures, whereas most recent work focuses on predicting bank or holding company supervisory ratings. Third, we test for a wide variety of market variables with deep theoretical or empirical roots, including market returns, return volatility, return patterns, dividend policy, market valuations, and trading volume.
In summary, the several years preceding bank failure are well suited for testing the formation of market-related return patterns. This period is associated with an unusually large amount of private information regarding a fundamental change in a bank's health at the same time that published financial data are abundant. Moreover, previous research has confirmed that pre-failure return patterns in the banking industry consistent with a variety of market-related variables are potentially related to financial distress. Testing the failure-predictive content of these variables vis-à-vis that of publicly available financial data explores the ability of the variables to help predict bank failure.
Sample and Data
The sample comprises approximately 40 percent banks and 60 percent thrifts that were publicly traded and failed during the 1989-1995 period. The 1989 cutoff was chosen to avoid the many problems that existed in the banking and thrift industries before that date. In the case of thrifts, 1989 marked a watershed year with the passage of the Federal Financial Institutions
Reform and Recovery Act (FIRREA), which not only provided a portion of the funds needed to resolve the thrift crisis but also contained provisions improving safety and soundness, such as higher capital requirements. 4 While the banking crisis of the 1980s was not as deep as the thrift crisis of the same era, the late 1980s nevertheless marked a sea change in bank regulation, owing to an increase in the regularity of bank examinations and other requirements. 4 See Gupta and Misra (1999) for an overview of changes made to the banking system throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. 5 For example, figure 12.4 in Curry et al. (1997) shows a spike in the median examination period for failed banks during the mid-1980s, followed by much lower levels beginning in approximately 1989.
Since our goal is to compare the failure-predictive content of market-related variables relative to the content of a bank's Call Report financial data, the sample excludes multibank holding companies. This restriction ensures that the Call Report financial data commonly used in failure-prediction models directly correspond to the institution that issues the stock traded in the market. 6 The restriction also reduces contamination from nonbank activities present in many holding companies as well as from "cross-subsidy" policies, whereby banks in multibank holding companies provide credit support for other members. Regrettably, the exclusion of multibank holding companies prevents inferences regarding our results from extending beyond the confines of our sample. Nevertheless, the "cost" of limited application seems more than offset by the "benefit" of fostering the cleanest possible environment for testing the failure- Pettway's (1980) 8 In the sample, the most common reasons for de-listing were insufficient number of market makers and insufficient capital. 9 For example, for the 4-, 8-, and 12-quarter regressions before failure, the total sample of failed banks and thrifts is 86, 85, and 63 respectively. As noted, for each set of failed institutions there is a control sample of equal finding of negative average returns many years before bank failure. In our case, the larger sample facilitates the computation of t-statistics testing the hypotheses that the mean of the quarterly cumulative compounded returns equals zero. The t-tests show that the negative returns in 13 of the first 16 quarters preceding failure are statistically significant, suggesting a statistically recognizable pattern of negative returns for several years preceding failure. indexes. 10 This effort also resulted in excess returns that are consistently negative and significant at the 1 percent or 5 percent level. Since the behaviors of the three excess return estimates are very similar, we use the CRSP value-weighted index for the remainder of this study in the interests of transparency.
An intriguing aspect of market data is that various aspects of financial theory effectively extend the list of market-related variables beyond prices and returns. For example, table 1 proceeds by examining two risk variables commonly associated with Fama and French (1993): market capitalization and the market-to-book value of equity ratio (ME/BE). Steadily declining prices cause market capitalization (price times number of shares) to follow a similar downward trend throughout the 16 quarters reported. The declining value of market equity also explains the monotonic slide of the ME/BE ratio throughout the period preceding failure. The trend in the ME/BE variable reveals the change in a consistent fashion as default approaches. Also, the dummy dividend variable shows a consistent declining path throughout the four-year period, as fewer firms pay dividends in response to declining financial fortunes or regulatory mandate.
The last risk variable shown in table 1 is return volatility. This variable is most closely associated with Merton's (1974) option model, which anticipates a rise in return volatility as an institution approaches insolvency. 11 As demonstrated, return volatility rises steadily from 2.47 in quarter 16 to 13.87 percent in quarter 1. Clearly, volatility represents an effective univariate gauge of default risk similar to the other risk variable, the ME/BE variable. Table 2 performs a sensitivity analysis of the aggregate value-weighted excess returns 10 Bank and thrift industry indexes were created from approximately 2,200 institutions that could be identified on the CRSP and tied back to their specific charter. Separate value-weighted indexes were created for banks and thrifts using the CRSP utility for creating value-weighted indexes (DSXPORT). At the beginning of each year, the sample of banks or thrifts was set, then the index calculated for one year. The final index combined the yearly indexes into a continuous long-term series. 11 French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) lend empirical support to this view by documenting a positive relation reported in table 1. The first cut breaks returns by two measures of institution size: total assets and trading volume. To the extent that larger-sized, more heavily traded firms are better known and more closely monitored by market analysts, investors, and bank regulators than smaller, less actively traded organizations, it is anticipated that the market would be more sensitive to changes in their idiosyncratic risk and financial condition. This should be reflected in market returns and trading volume as firms approach insolvency.
In both cases, the market seems to be aware of changes in financial condition across all size classes several years before insolvency, but the trends are slightly stronger for the smallest institutions. For example, returns for institutions with assets below $1 billion are negative and significant in almost all 16 quarters before failure, while almost all of the returns are statistically significant for the $1 billion to $5 billion class and slightly less significant for the over-$5 billion class. A similar pattern of return persistence in smaller firms can be seen in the three columns of excess returns split by trading volume. Apparently, local knowledge about changes in financial condition spreads quickly through the grapevine, which may account for some of these effects.
The last four columns of table 2 distinguish the excess returns of low versus high ME/BE ratios and bank versus thrift charters. In both cases, excess returns appear very similar to the aggregate excess returns shown in table 1. That is, returns are always negative, they tend to be stronger for the smaller-sized firms, they are about the same for both banks and thrifts, the highest negative values tend to be relatively close to failure, and, in most cases, the returns are statistically significant at a high level of significance. The sample line at the bottom of table 2 shows that the average number of institutions in the 16 quarters of univariate analysis was 42 banks and 48 thrifts.
between the volatility of market returns and market excess returns (market return minus T-bill spread). as the third moment of daily returns divided by the standard deviation of daily returns raised to the third power. That is, the n daily log price differences described earlier for quarterly samples.
Skewness is measured by the following equation:
12 Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) find supportive empirical evidence that large daily price movements are
The skewness variable reported in table 3 fails to exhibit a consistent failure-related trend. For example, SKEW i moves erratically but shows some tendency to be higher in the fourth and first years before failure, but lower in the second and third years before failure. This pattern does not appear closely related to either the featureless trading volume series in table 3 or the steadily declining price and return series shown in tables 1 and 2.
In summary, the univariate analysis of the market-related variables in tables 1-3 finds a few patterns that illustrate long-term trends preceding failure. Equity price, excess returns, market-to-book equity, and return volatility variables in table 1 exhibit the most distinct trends as the banks in the sample approach failure.
The Predictive Content of Market versus Financial Variables
In the multivariate tests, we proceed by specifying a traditional bank failure-prediction model from Call Report financial data. We then alter this model by incorporating equity market variables along with the financial data. The traditional model is a bivariate discrete choice model using logistic regression to explain the fail/no-fail binary independent variable, FAIL, at 4, 8, and 12 quarters preceding failure. The one-to three-year period preceding failure is somewhat longer than the one-to two-year periods found in several earlier studies because we are especially interested in identifying market patterns before changes in financial ratios, which are already widely used for predictive purposes. In addition, analyzing this extended time before failure will test the forward-looking nature of market information to determine whether it can assist failure prediction. This approach also helps address Shumway's (2001) concern that data followed by high trading volume.
for extended periods preceding failure need to be included in traditional failure-prediction models.
As previously noted, the sample of failed banks for the logistic regression differs slightly from that used in the univariate analysis because of data constraints. The sample for the logistic regression contains 86 publicly traded institutions that failed during the 1989 to 1995 period and for which complete Call Report and CRSP data were available 4 quarters preceding failure. The variable definitions and statistics are presented in 37 percent of our sample of failed banks, whereas thrifts represent 63 percent. This variable is used to separate these institutions and to account for the relatively high failure rates that thrifts and later banks experienced in the post-FIRREA period. The coefficient for the "charter" dummy has no expected value in the failure prediction models for this paper because neither banks nor thrifts will tend to have higher failure probabilities,
given similar financial ratios and asset sizes. Moreover, the role of the charter dummy is ambiguous in models with market data because market efficiency suggests that market assessments of the likelihood of failure should not be systematically biased by charter or other industry indexes.
A traditional failure-prediction model is specified with financial ratios from the Call Reports (table 4) . 14 The first variable, the book equity-to-assets ratio, EQ_AS, is a standard capital ratio expected to vary inversely with failure. An asset-quality variable, NC_RES, measures credit risk as the difference between noncurrent (delinquent) assets and loss reserves, divided by total assets, and is expected to be positively related to the likelihood of failure. Loan provisions to total assets, PROV_AS, could be positively or negatively correlated with the likelihood of failure, depending on the period examined. For example, for the year before bank failure, a negative relationship could result because banks in serious financial straits may be unable to set aside earnings (most such banks are experiencing losses). Conversely, two or three years before failure, banks may be provisioning for possible loan losses in an effort to replenish reserves and restore capital in order to remain solvent and satisfy regulatory scrutiny. In this instance, loan provisioning may be positively related to the likelihood of failure. A common return-on-assets variable, ROA, is expected to have a negative coefficient. A securities-to-assets ratio, SC_AS, is a liquidity variable with an expected negative sign. A second measure of liquidity, volatile liabilities divided by assets, VOL_AS, has an expected positive sign because of an association between funding problems and higher levels of volatile liabilities.
The first group of independent market variables consists of widely used, or "core," market variables. Obvious starting points are the excess market price, EXPRC, and excess return, EXRET, variables as defined in table 4. The DIV variable measures dividend policy before failure, with a dummy variable that equals unity for periods when dividends are paid, and zero otherwise. 15 As mentioned, typically dividends are postponed during times of distress, often with the encouragement of regulators. 16 We expect all three core variables to be negatively related to failure.
The second set of market variables measures risk with the use of the Fama and French standard market model, which contains the natural logarithm of market capitalization (LN_ME) and market equity divided by book equity (ME_BE). These two variables are expected to have negative signs. The option theoretic variable, the standard deviation of returns (SDRET) as cited by Merton (1974) , is also included as an additional risk measure. Since risk rises as failure conflicting size effects, we elected to omit a size variable from our traditional Call Report model. 15 We define DIV as a market-related variable because the dividend amounts that the banks distributed were obtained with the other market data from CRSP. However, data on bank dividends paid on capital stock are available from the Call Report. 16 Bank regulators generally insist on the postponement of dividend payments when institutions enter a "problembank" stage, which is typically at a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5, although it can occur earlier.
approaches, the coefficient for the SDRET variable are expected to be positively related to failure.
The remaining market variables are selected to test for other patterns or trends before failure. Two trading activity variables from table 3, trading volume and turnover, are very similar measures of the same effect, so we use only the turnover measure (TURN) in our published tests, and report here that the choice has not affected the results. A related measure, the standard deviation of volume (SDVOL), is used alongside TURN because the volatility of trading volume is one step removed from direct measures of trading activity. The signs of the two trading activity variables, TURN and SDVOL, are predicted to be positive.
In summary, the logistic regressions are organized as follows: variables that measure the impact of core market variables; β 11 …β 13 are the coefficients that control for risk effects; and β 14 …β 15 take account of other market variables. We report here that correlation between the independent variables did not appear to be a problem. 17 17 The correlation coefficients fell at acceptable levels except for SC_AS and VL_AS which fell between -0.81 and -0.83, and PROV_AS and ROA which ranged from 0.77 to 0.78 depending on the sample. However, since eliminating these variables had no meaningful effect on the reported results, both variables are included in the reported regressions.
The regression results are shown in table 5. Specifications 1 through 6 initialize two failure-prediction models, one focused on Call Report financial data and the other on marketrelated variables, with controls in both for charter type. In specification 1, the performance of the Call Report financial ratios is generally consistent with expectations, as five Call Report coefficients are significant at the 10 percent or higher level, and all but the PROV_AS variable have their anticipated signs. The unanticipated negative and significant sign for the PROV_AS variable could be explained by the inability of a bank, which fails within a year, to provision for loan losses because in all likelihood, the bank is reporting earnings losses during this period. In specification 2, the coefficients for all three core market variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, the explanatory power of specification 2 is less than that of the Call Report model as measured by pseudo-R 2 ( R 2 ) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), so the core market model has less explanatory power than the traditional financial ratios.
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Specifications 3 through 5 incorporate the risk and other market variables into the core market variable regression of specification 2. The comparison begins in specification 3, where the risk variables are added to the core market model of specification 2. In this case, only the risk variable, SDRET, becomes significant. The explanatory power of the regression shows a marginal improvement from specification 2. However, comparison of specifications 2 and 3, through a likelihood ratio test (LRT) using a chi-square statistic, finds that the risk variables significantly improve the performance of the core market variable model at the 5 percent level.
Specification 4 combines the core market model with the other market-related variables to find that the addition of these variables slightly improves the core model from specification 2.
Three of the core market variables have statistically significant coefficients. In contrast, only 18 The lower the value for the AIC variable, the better the fit of the model. one of the other market variables is statistically significant (TURN). An LRT statistic significant at the 1 percent level confirms the importance of adding the other market variables to the core model in specification 2, while the R 2 shows a slightly improved explanatory power of specification 4.
Specification 5 combines the performance of all the market variables into a single model.
The results show that four of the eight market variables are significant at the 1 percent to 10 percent level. In this case, the LRT test finds that the regression represents again a slight improvement over the core market model in specification 2, with a fit that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This is supported by a higher a R 2 and a lower AIC value.
Specification 6 incorporates the benchmark Call Report model in specification 1 and combines the best-performing market variables from specification 5. In this case, an LRT finds that the regression represents a significant improvement over the initial Call Report model as shown in specification 1. The combined model in specification 6 exhibits a lower AIC value and higher R 2 relative to specification 1 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, demonstrating that selected market variables do add value to the basic Call Report modeldespite the surprising observation that only two of the Call Report variables are statistically significant, and none of the market variables. However, the market variables do have the correct signs and contribute significantly to the model, as revealed by the LRT test. In summary, the market variables do provide some explanatory power to accounting data in the identification of bank failures. The in-sample tests show that market data incrementally improve the identification of failed and nonfailed institutions as we pass from Call Report data in equation 1 to the combined model in specification 6. The correctly identified failed institutions increase from an already high 97 percent to 99 percent-or (in terms of the number of institutions) from 53 to about 55, or a modest 3 percent increase. The correct identification of banks that survived also increases slightly.
The out-of-sample tests show larger but insignificant increases in the correct classifications of failed and nonfailed institutions when equity market data are added to the Call Report model. In percentage terms, the predictive accuracy of the Call Report model in specification 1 (94 percent) is higher than the accuracy of the models that incorporated market data (specifications 2 through 5) but is below the combined model in specification 6 (95 percent);
in terms of the average number of banks correctly identified, this increases from 29.13 to 29.46 banks for specifications 1 and 6, respectively. While the change is not large, it should be noted that the average resolution cost to the FDIC of the failed banks in this study was $220.3 million.
Thus, even if the model identified only one additional failed bank by incorporating market data, it would be worth it. In addition, as with the in-sample test, the correct prediction of surviving banks also increased slightly. 
Conclusions
This paper explores the notion that market-related variables may be used to augment financial ratios for the purpose of predicting bank failures over the 1989-1995 period.
Univariate analysis documents distinct patterns of declining prices, negative returns, rising return volatility, declining dividends and falling market-to-book equity ratios for several years before failure. However, no clear trend emerges for several other market measures, such as trading volume and return skewness.
Multivariate tests examine and support the ability of market-related variables to improve the failure-predictive content of more traditional models, which are based on Call Report financial ratios. The inclusion of equity market variables such as stock price, return, and volatility of returns significantly improves the ability of the model to identify institutions that failed over the 1989-1995 period for up to three years before the failed event. The in-sample and out-of-sample classifications show that the simultaneous use of equity market data and Call
Report variables does generally yield larger numbers of failed and nonfailed banks being correctly predicted. The empirical results of this paper support the use of forward-looking equity market variables to complement the Call Report financial variables to produce a more accurate failure-prediction model. In this regard, relatively simple measures of market activity, such as price, excess return, and volatility of returns, appear to capture the primary failure-predictive content of observable market activity. The stock price, excess return, and other variables reported on the 16 quarter-to-failure lines are calculated as simple averages from the individual sample values. The stock price and market capital (stock price times shares
Call Report value of the equity, where both are measured as of end-of-quarter values. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis below the quarterly average return percentages. A single, double or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent levels respectively outstanding) variables are averaged over all trading days in each quarter. All excess returns are calculated as the difference between the cumulative quarterly return of each stock and the cumulative quarterly return of the index. The "Dividend Paid in Qtr. Dummy" variable equals unity if an institution pays a dividend in the current quarter, and 0 otherwise. ME/BE is the market-to-book equity ratio, calculated as the market value of equity divided by the The stock price, excess return, and other reported variables are calculated as simple averages from the individual sample values. All returns are expressed as percentages, and calculated as the difference between the cumulative quarterly return of each stock and cumulative quarterly shown in parentiesis below the quarterly average return percentages. A single, double or triple "*" indiciates significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1 % levels respectively.
return of the value weighted CRSP index. Asset size is determined by total assets, as reported on the Call Reports. Trading volume is the average of all daily trading volumes reported throughout the quarter on the CRSP tapes. ME/BE is the market-to-book equity ratio, calculated as the market value of equity divided by the Call Report book value of equity, where both are measured as end-of-quarter values.
Institutions are classified as banks (thrifts) if they are insured by the bank insurance fund (savings asociation insurance fund). T-statistics are NOTE: (1) EQ_AS and SDRET cause frequent complete separations between failed and nonfailed banks in specified regressions and are labelled as 'N/A'. their corresponding coefficients. A single, double, or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%,5% and 1% levels respectively. Table 5 . The bootstrap procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1998; Freedman and Peters, 1984 ) is used to estimate the applied to a sample of 62 banks and thrifts (31 failed and 31 non-failed) held in the out-of-sample group. The critical probability used to determine failure is 50 percent.
in-sample and out-of-sample classification accuracy of the 6 logistic regressions performed in Table 5 NOTE: (1) STDVOL perfectly separates failed and nonfailed banks in particular regressions, and are labelled as 'N/A'.
12 quarters before failure. T-statistics are shown in parentheses below their corresponding regression coefficents. A single, double or triple "*" indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table extends the logit regressions performed in Table 7 , using a sample of 85 failed banks and thrifts and and equal number of institutions in a control sample for 8 quarters before failure and a sample of 63 failed banks and thrifts and an equal number of non-failed instituions for
